As Eritreans struggling for justice, we remain resilient in the face of a brutal dictatorial regime that has denied us the basic rights and services to live in dignity for the last 35 years. The regime has made our hard-won independence, which belongs to the people, a mockery of a nationalist, expansionist Ethiopian regime that threatens us day in, day out to grab our land and grab our ports, while the atrocities committed by its army are still fresh in our memories. We fear those atrocities may be repeated if Ethiopia is to enter Eritrea. The two architects of the Tigray War of 2020–2022 corner us and pull us apart.
Our rejection of the regime does not mean we accept external aggression, as defending Eritrean sovereignty does not mean endorsing dictatorship. No one would shed tears if the destabilising regime were gone, but an Eritrea that is at peace with itself and its neighbours and will continue to exist. Eritreans worry that Isaias, who treats Eritrea as his personal fiefdom, could make major concessions to Abiy if it could save his regime.
We reject wars waged by our regime and continued interference in other countries’ affairs or wars waged by our neighbours; we remain committed to peaceful coexistence, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the region.
Eritrea’s situation
Thirty-five years after independence, the Eritrean government fails to provide essential goods and basic services for about 3 million people. Basic human rights are denied. Ironically, most essential goods in Eritrea come from two war-torn neighbouring countries, Sudan and Yemen.
In the Afar region and along the coast, residents report severe shortages of wheat flour used to make local bread. Beyond the Afar region, fuel shortages and restrictions on the circulation of the Nakfa currency make matters worse.
For coastal communities, Yemen is a vital source of supplies. In Yemen, the Afar receive preferential treatment, unlike other Eritreans, because of historical connections. Afar fishermen go to Yemen to buy what they need. If the Eritrean navy intercepts them, it confiscates their goods and uses them. One individual I contacted in Edi, along the Eritrean coast, says people in the Afar region worry more about famine than about war with Ethiopia.
In the Dahlak Islands, the Yemeni riyal is the most commonly used currency. In western and central Eritrea, people mostly smuggle essential goods from Kassala in Sudan, including cereals and even construction materials. Those trading networks sustain communities as the state fails to deliver. At the same time, they expose families to insecurity on both sides of the border.
Besides the psychological impact, families of those in detention bear a financial burden. A relative of a detainee in one of the detention centres around Asmara told me that families were asked to provide money for food, with prisoners purchasing necessities from shops inside the facility. This account concerns one centre, but it raises serious questions about conditions behind Eritrea’s prison walls.
Remittances under state control
Diaspora remittances provide another lifeline, but recipients face restrictive exchange arrangements and delays. Diaspora send remittances to relatives in hard currency, and their relatives receive the money in local currency through Himbol, the government-owned forex bureau, which pays at official rates well below those available in an unrestricted market. For example, US$100 yields 1,500 nakfa. With independent exchange services prohibited and unauthorised operators facing severe punishment, families have little choice. As financial services in the country are not digitalised and depend on cumbersome paperwork, a beneficiary in Asmara may receive the money the same day or the next. But if someone sends money to towns like Massawa, the beneficiary may not receive the badly needed help for up to two weeks.
Despite the dire situation, the regime holds seminars for Eritreans in the diaspora regarding the prospects of war with Ethiopia, telling them that everything is under control, that they are well prepared, and that they should rest assured but be prepared for eventualities. Internally, seminars mobilise people to the frontlines.
Ethiopians have their problems, too
Across the border, in Ethiopia, despite economic growth and mega projects, IMF and World Bank prescriptions have made ordinary citizens’ lives dire, with prices soaring. The country spends lavishly on the military rather than on development. It faces a severe humanitarian crisis driven by conflict, insecurity, displacement, climate shocks and high food prices.
In March 2026, Sweden’s aid agency, Sida, projected that 15–16 million people would need urgent food assistance by July 2026 and estimated that 19.3 million would need humanitarian assistance overall. Close to two million people are internally displaced. Conflict undermines livelihoods across three major regions.
Government drones take a heavy toll on human lives in the countryside, as do ethnic and religious clashes and border conflict between the various regions. Besides state violence, with arms widespread, there is also a culture among some communities of resolving minor disputes through violence. The current fighting at Moyale, along the Kenyan border between the special forces of the Oromo and Somali regions, though both belong to the same ruling party, the PP, is a manifestation of the insecurity in the country. Similar fighting has occurred between the Somali and Afar regions.
In Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA)’s insurgency since 2018 has restricted movement, disrupted agriculture and trade, and weakened access to services. Kidnapping and extortion drain household resources, while insecurity obstructs humanitarian operations.
In the Amhara region, the Fano uprising since 2023 has blocked transport routes and markets, disrupted agricultural activity and aid deliveries, raised food prices, and reduced families’ purchasing power.
In Tigray, major displacement and damaged infrastructure have left livelihoods fragile. Renewed fighting threatens recovery, access to farmland, and supplies of food and medicine. The current war in Tigray has forced the TPLF to withdraw from the major towns, but it does not mean it has lost the war. Unless the Ethiopian army and the Tigray Peace Forces win the hearts and minds of Tigrayans and resolve major issues as soon as possible, Tigrayans may end up fighting each other in a protracted war. Amid all this, the prime minister seems unconcerned, as long as his power centre is secure.
A confrontation the region cannot afford
An Eritrea–Ethiopia war would unfold within an increasingly entangled regional landscape. Eritrea’s alignment with Egypt and Sudan, and Ethiopia’s close relationship with the United Arab Emirates, along with its ties to Israel and Somaliland, create channels through which outside interests could deepen or widen a confrontation.
For Eritreans, the answer cannot be unconditional loyalty to a government that has impoverished and repressed them. Nor can it be acquiescence to Ethiopian territorial ambitions in the hope that external force will deliver liberation.
Our position must remain clear: Eritrean sovereignty is inviolable, the dictatorship must end, and another war must be prevented. The people of both countries need accountable government, food, livelihoods and peace. Their suffering must not become the foundation for another contest between rulers.
Dr Mohamed Kheir Omer
